“Hermeneutical Injustice,” Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, forthcoming.

“Social Ontology,” (with Katherine Ritchie), Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, forthcoming.

“Social Metaphysics,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2018.

The Metaphysics of Social Kinds.” Philosophy Compass, 2016: 841-850.

Review of Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. Hypatia Reviews Online. 2013.

Two Kinds of Unknowing.” Hypatia, 2011: 294-307.

Work in Progress

Please email for drafts.

  1. Social Kinds, Essence, and Dependence
  2. On the Reality of Social Kinds
  3. On the Nature of Social Kinds
  4. Social Kind Terms and the Concept of Woman
  5. Oppression and Incredulity
  6. Grounding Social Construction
  7. Deflating Social Construction

I am also working on a book manuscript entitled Social Ontology Naturalized.

It is a truism that humans are social animals. Thus, it is no surprise that we understand the world, each other, and ourselves in terms of social kinds such as money and marriage, war and women, race, recession, and refugee. Social kinds condition our expectations, inform our preferences, and guide our behavior. Despite the prevalence and importance of social kinds, contemporary philosophy has devoted relatively little attention to them. With few exceptions, philosophers have given pride of place to the kinds studied by the natural sciences, especially physics. When philosophers turn their attention to other scientific domains, chemical, biological, and psychological kinds dominate the discussion. But insofar as philosophers are concerned to explain what the world is like, they ought to be concerned to explain what the social world is like. My project promises to transform how we think of the world by undermining the traditional contrast between society and nature. I develop and argue for a radical view: many social kinds are natural kinds like those studied in the natural sciences. Moreover, social kinds, like many paradigmatically natural kinds, have real as opposed to merely nominal essences. These results lay the groundwork for a unified and systematic view of social kinds different from those on offer in the social ontology literature.